Introducing the capability approach 1.1 Background: Critique of other accountsĪlthough we can trace some aspects of the capability approach back to, among others, Aristotle, Adam Smith, and Karl Marx (see Nussbaum 1988, 1992, 20a, 1999: 14, 24 Walsh 2000), it is economist-philosopher Amartya Sen who pioneered the approach and philosopher Martha Nussbaum and a growing number of other scholars across the humanities and the social sciences who have significantly developed it.
This proliferation of capability literature has led to questions concerning what kind of framework it is (section 1) how its core concepts should be defined (section 2) how it can be further specified for particular purposes (section 3) what is needed to develop the capability approach into an account of social justice (section 4) how it relates to non-Western philosophies (section 5) and how it can be and has been applied in practice (section 6).ġ. Within philosophy, the capability approach has been employed to the development of several conceptual and normative theories within, most prominently, development ethics, political philosophy, public health ethics, environmental ethics and climate justice, and philosophy of education. Whether someone can convert a set of means - resources and public goods - into a functioning (i.e., whether she has a particular capability) crucially depends on certain personal, sociopolitical, and environmental conditions, which, in the capability literature, are called ‘conversion factors.’ Capabilities have also been referred to as real or substantive freedoms as they denote the freedoms that have been cleared of any potential obstacles, in contrast to mere formal rights and freedoms. Capabilities are the doings and beings that people can achieve if they so choose - their opportunity to do or be such things as being well-nourished, getting married, being educated, and travelling functionings are capabilities that have been realized. The capability approach is a theoretical framework that entails two normative claims: first, the claim that the freedom to achieve well-being is of primary moral importance and, second, that well-being should be understood in terms of people’s capabilities and functionings.
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